Executive Summary
This paper considers the question of cost and performance in major weapon systems. The existing state of technology determines what is possible in every new design. How much technology to incorporate into hardware involves choices between performance (better quality) and lower cost (greater numbers). Current design practices place a decided emphasis on performance.
An articulate group of critics with a large following charges that unchecked pursuit of technological opportunities precludes intelligent cost-performance choices. Weapon systems feature large numbers of expensive gadgets that add little to military effectiveness and much to cost. As a result, we're buying in numbers too small to be really effective. These issues were part of a major debate in the 1970s but faded somewhat with increased funding during the 1980s. With the drawdowns and reassessments of the 1990s, the question of numbers versus performance will likely return to prominence.
Chapter I is an overview of past experience in exploiting technology for military purposes. Traditionally, the slow pace of innovation and institutional conservatism made technology a minor part of the military planning problem. However. modem military powers specifically plan to advance military technology and exploit that progress with deployed hardware. The most radical practitioner of the modem approach is the United States, which regards technical superiority as a vital national interest.
Chapter 2 is a summary of the critics' views. Fundamentally, they assert that the acquisition process precludes systematic, rational choices between cost and performance. New weapons reflect the pursuit of technical opportunities rather than concern for military effectiveness. Study of the process itself underpins the critics' case. Although it is possible to find fault with what the critics say, it is difficult to defend the process itself. It is also important to remember that the critics' views are widely shared in the policy-making community.
Chapter 3 considers the empirical record and concludes that system designs show evidence of a consistent, rational pursuit of combat effectiveness. A set of 66 Navy and Air Force tactical aircraft types constitute the case study. The data reveal a military judgment that quality is more important than quantity. with that assessment consistently reflected in actual designs. The data do not support the critics' belief that increments in performance come at increasingly higher cost.
Chapter 4 looks at some indicators for the future. First, recent studies of actual combat results suggest that quality is indeed more important than quantity. Second is the effect of increased uncertainty. With a changing threat and planning environment, we no longer have a predominant scenario such as Central tx Europe--therefore we have more uncertainty hi our planning problem. Insights from the theory of financial portfolios suggest we should pay extra for assets that reduce risk in lorce performance. Some study evidence indicates that higher performance forces are less risky. Hence, there is reason to believe t hat cont inued emphasis on performance is appropriate in post-cold war system designs. If we exclude the effects of < production rate, we note then real unit cost has grown at approximately 6 percent per year. Gansler's statement. This is evident in Commitment to mature technologies figure2.
means pursuit of ever-higher perforProposition 2 states that production mance and multimission capabilities rates have decreased over time, with the pursuit of higher performance being a key factor. The empirical evidence supports ingly higher cost of more performance." that hypothesis. In fact, there is a clear Proposition 3 therefore asserts that we downward trend over time, even after the observe higher performance, higher cost. effects of wars (Korean and Vietnam) and and greater tendency to mullimission performance have been included, as figdesigns. Virtually all observers would ure 3 shows. ' agree with the higher costs and capabilities over time. There is also some TASC data and taking into account coilevidence for designing more missions into dlitlons of production (to include costs of tactical aircraft, as shown in figure 4 . materials and learning curves), perlor- figure 5 . At any given level of technology. 'T. performance comes at a price described by the performance-cost frontier. AA. 2 ' Therefore, the service faces the choice between fewer but more capable aircraft, or more numerous but less capable aircraft, as depicted in figure  6 . The curve 13B represents budget con--straint of the form ,
where C is average unit cost as a I.unction of performance (q) and x is number procured. observed behavior is consistent with the If true, proposition 5.a falsifies 5. If rational design niodel: there is strong evidence to support the proposition (5.a) proposition 5.a were notite, wetwul that system designs consistently reflect expect to find the estimated parameters an assessment ofthe roles of system perof model (3.1) to be of doubtful slgformance and numbers in producing nificance. We would also expect to find combat etliectiveness. the overall model to be of dubious value
The second finding provides a new in explaining cost variances., If, as perspective for viewing the conventional proposition 5 asserts, weapon system wisdom (especially in propositions 1-4).
designs are becoming increasingly baThe critics appear to be reasonab)ly acroque or gold plated, we would expect to curate observers, but not proftound find some evidence of changes in behavior analysts. In fact, the more damning the over time, with the estimated value for S, assertion offered, the less the empirical increasing. nificant number of whom are retired ofsimpler air-to-air lighters.:%) Likewise, ficers) compiled all the data used here.
the imporlance of a regular -presenceAlthough there appears to be no ulterior over the battlefleld (achievable throt:,al objectives in the work cited, those deterlarge numbers) has been used to support mined to distrust the military or deprethe contention that numbers are also cate military expertise will distr-ust of more important in air-to-ground misdeprecate the analysis presented. Secret, 1988. It seems significant that neither this where C is real cost pci unit. Co is a constant. 1'ris nor the previous reference (note 1) has received time and R is production rate. The parameter io Is general publication.
e.xpected to oc positive arid n negative. Fortunately, an established body of knowledge, called portfolio theory, provides useful insights In planning for risky situations. In financial markets, investors may purchase a wide variety of assets, each having an expected return and a certain amount of risk attached. Portfolio theory deals with the selection of an optimal mix of assets (optimal A "portfolio"). The theory also has some useful insights into cost-performance trade-offs in weapon system designs."' A central assumption of the theory is that investors are risk averse, preferring RISK less risky portfolios. other things being equal. Similarly, it is reasonable to stLPpose that defense planners are risk averse Figure 8 with respect to the capabilities of their forces in various combat situations.
With the absence of a market and riskPortfolio theory centers on utility maxfree asset in weapons design, many of the imization under conditions of uncertainresults of portfolio theory do not apply ty. Each asset has a return that depends directly to weapon design. However, the basic insights gleaned are very useful. sionf Increases systemn pertloiiati(ce ini [ti We know that investors are willing to pay optimum design. more for a less risky asset than a simple
The Implication is that if we lessen risk calculation of expected return implies.20
by increased performanice, we should The optimum system design includes choose performance levels beyond that consideration of expected force effectiveimplied by expected value considerations. ness (good) and also variability in el-ecIf increased perlorinance increases risk, tiveness (bad). To see the elfiects of risk then the opposite conclusion applies. aversion in design choices, we can revisit There is no definite answer to the ques- figure 6 and incorporate the effects of tion ofwhether performance redtices risk. being risk averse by formulating an obbut some results using the TAC Warrior jective function to be maximized by model of air combat in Europe are interdesign choice:
esting and suggestive. A major simula-=~ EtI -A var(I. (4.9) lion study, documented by Frederick L.
Frostic, explicitly considers quantitywhere U is the value of "utility" attached perfornmance issues in tactical air forcesto a system design, EIR) is expected effecthrough analysis of equal-cost tiveness. var(R) is variability of effectivecombinations of high-performai ice F-I15s ness as employment conditions change, versus cheaper, "austere" fighters. 2 ' and A Is a mea'.iore of risk aversion. If we
The base case for the simulation indon't care about risk, A Is zero, increasing cluded clear air mass conditions. One risk aversion Is reflected in larger values excursion considered degraded weather. of A.
Results showed that as weather condi- Figure 9 shows the effects of risk a'-erlions deteriorated, the effectiveness of the slon. If increased performance lessens lower-performance option was lessened risk, then the indifferenze curves rotate much more: -The austere day lighter (eftoward the verticai-as shown by MM' fectiveness) ... is significantly degraded., versus NN'. 'Ihe result Is that risk averwhile the F-15 option improves slightly. performance. Frostic's conclusions are only suggestive. Franklin C. Spinney, for example. has argued that the maintainability of the more complex F-15 in combat is also a source of risk. 2 • We need more study of such risks before reaching any definite conclusions. Some evidence shows that "higher-performance designs lessen risk, RISK NEUTRAL• \ and that rational designers should there-CHOICE f' fore show a special willingness to pay bor RISK AVERSE " more quality in system designs.
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Implications for Planning
PERFORMANCE
This chapter has considered some factors pertaining to design practices in lhe Figure 9 post--cold war era. There are two major
